

## Potential Assets for Stage 1

### A. POTENTIAL ASSET: INCREASE BANKS PUMPING CAPACITY

Expand the period when high flows on the SJR allow exports to increase to 1/3 of SJR inflow.

Or:

Expand Banks pumping capacity from 6300 to about 8500 cfs by changing COE limitation.

### GAMING RESULTS SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING

1. Asset can yield enhanced exports in some years, removing flexibility from summer and fall.
2. Asset can help fill San Luis by November, avoid conflicts with outmigrating salmon in December-April.
3. Asset can create some water in dry years.
4. Problems with asset occur in years of medium to high inflow.

### SHARING OF ASSET COULD INCLUDE:

1. Share water pumped in excess of current limits (EWA 50%, WMS 50% of all pumping at Banks in excess of 6300 cfs).
2. Use asset to augment export supply in dry years. Use asset to augment EWA in wetter years.
3. Use different increments of increased export capacity to generate WMA supply and EWA supply. The lower increment would be used more frequently.

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**CONSTRAINTS & CONCERNS:**

COE Limitation

Endangered species concerns

Tides, vegetation could limit intake capacity

South Delta agriculture opposition

Possible environmental community opposition

## B. POTENTIAL ASSET REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY

Manipulation of the Export/Inflow restriction is the only readily available tool.

The averaging period (14 days) this restriction is as important in determining its impact as the target number (35% Feb-June, 65% July-Jan).

## GAMING RESULTS SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING

1. The E/I restriction has an impact on federal contract commitments to percent deliveries almost every year.
2. The E/I restriction affects exports only in the Feb-June period in drier years.
3. Changing the averaging period from 14 days to 3 days made substantial quantities of water available to the EWA. This approach was more effective than changing the E/I ratio.

## SHARING OF THE ASSET COULD INCLUDE:

1. Establishing high priority, short-term storage site for water generated from this asset.
2. Establishing process for transferring water generated from this asset to export interests if not needed within the period during which storage is available.  
(i.e., simple purchase, swap of EWA water in San Luis for upstream water)

**CONSTRAINTS & CONCERNS:**

SWRCB approval process

Closely linked to governance of EWA

#### C. POTENTIAL ASSET MARKET ACTIONS

The San Joaquin River Agreement is a model of contracting for environmental water supplies on a long-term basis while minimizing impacts on other users.

Contracts and options similar to the San Joaquin River Agreement could be used as part of any increased supplies into the Delta.

#### GAMING RESULTS SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

1. Not all EWA actions require that water be available for export.
2. Some EWA actions can have secondary improvements to WO in Delta.
3. EWA purchases have the potential to reduce transfer capacity and drive up prices.

#### SHARING OF ASSET COULD INCLUDE:

1. Pooling of funds to purchase supplies at a discounted rate for each party.
2. Pooling of funds from water quality programs to help achieve environmental improvements at lower cost to each party.
3. Access to more general support, reasonable prices, and opportunities by way of shared goals.

**CONSTRAINTS & CONCERNS:**

SWRCB approval process

Local agency approval processes

Impact on price of water

Size of purchases unprecedented in non-drought years with non-ag buyers

#### D. POTENTIAL ASSET ACCESS TO SURPLUS CAPACITY

Allowing one project to take advantage of unused capacity at the other project's facilities. Sharing of capacity.

This is typically discussed as Joint Point of Diversion (JPOD). However, restructuring of the COA has the capacity to enhance such reoperations.

#### GAMING RESULTS SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

1. The asset sharing of capacity at facilities is a prerequisite to an effective EWA.
2. Unlimited use of the asset allows for increased supplies in medium to wetter years mostly to federal contractors. There are some impacts of entrainment and associated mortality.
3. Use of JPOD may produce conflict between state and federal contractors for interruptible supplies.

#### SHARING OF ASSET COULD INCLUDE:

1. Sharing unused capacity at cost. EWA loses its storage capacity whenever needed by another user.
2. Share water pumped using JPOD between federal contractors and EWA.
3. Provide storage in San Luis for water pumped using JPOD with some priority that balances possible impacts of additional pumping.
4. Some portion of federal storage supplies available to state contractors or compensation paid to state interruptible supply users by federal contractors.